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The death of the ‘Community method’ 
…and the immediate future of the EU
Herman Voogsgeerd. 
1. Introduction
The so-called Community method has been very successful in the first five decades of 
existence of the EEC/EC/EU. Since the Treaty of Maastricht (1991) and the 
increase in the number of member-states from six to twenty-eight the method has 
become obsolescent1. Let us be clear: the Community method is dead. I agree with 
Majone that this method was designed only for a small group of homogeneous 
countries in 1958. But what is the next stage of European integration now that 
member-states strongly disagree about the pace and nature of the process? How 
can we change, starting from this method? ‘Europe can’t be reformed’, was heard 
during the Brexit campaign in the UK in 2016. One core characteristic of the 
Community method has always been to be vague about the finality, the end-goal, 
of the integration process. European integration was created as a rational and not 
an emotional process. This vague finality and the idea of a never stopping bullet 
train to ever more integration and a higher number of member-states is at the basis 
of increasing unease and discomfort in not only the old member-states, but also in 
the newer Central and East-European member-states. The very idea of 
supranationalism seems to be at stake. The nation states are the building blocks of 
the EU and the masters of the Treaties (‘Herren der Verträge’). If large parts of the 
population in the nation states are uncomfortable with the EU as it has been 
developed, the EU itself will be in trouble. 
This contribution will start from the assumption that there is an urgent need to move 
beyond the Community method in European integration and cooperation. Are the 
options the European Commission put on the table the 1st of March 2017 an 
alternative to the Community method? Or are more common terms such as 
‘confederation’ or ‘federation’ to be preferred? It is not a speculative argument that 
will be presented. I will pay attention to how we can move away from the actual 
Community method, taking the rapidly changing global context into account. It 
will pay attention to theoretical approaches to the nature of European integration, 
but also legal issues focusing on recent case law of the CJEU that is already paying 
more ‘respect’ to issues related to national identity. 
2. The Community method
1 Giandomenico Majone, Europe as the Would-be World Power, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), chapter 7.
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The Community method, basically, consists of ground-rules to make this community of 
member-states work. These ground-rules are found in the original EEC Treaty, e.g. 
the important political and pro-integration role of the European Commission to 
defend the common interests of the member-states. This method has been 
successful from the 1960s to the end of the 1980s, when the EEC consisted of 
relatively homogeneous member-states struggling to rebuild their economies after 
the Second world war. Essential factors in this success were de-politicization and 
technocratic decision-making through elites, especially at the helm of the European 
Commission. These bureaucratic elites came from the Commission, national 
bureaucrats and experts also played an immensely important role in the so-called 
comitology procedures. Decision-making by ‘Brussels’ therefore includes many 
national officials. Because of weak input legitimacy and lack of democracy, the 
focus was on output legitimacy and good decision-making in the interest of the 
‘general good’. Arend Lijpharts’ theory of consociationalism has been applied to 
decision making in the European Community. This theory explains stability in 
heterogeneous societies such as the Netherlands in the past with its separate and 
homogeneous protestant, catholic, liberal and socialist pillars with each their own 
schools, broadcasting corporations and politicians. Politicians and elites from the 
pillars cooperated in The Hague and this cooperation was characterized by 
stability, at least for some decades. De-pillarization was inevitable in later years as 
the pillars became less homogeneous. Applying consociationalism to the European 
Community would imply de-politicization and elite cooperation2. The peoples of 
the member-states form the pillars. Politicization would be the worst option in this 
consociationalist view because it could lead to destabilization. Politics is for the 
member-states and technocracy for the EC level. This construction could last as 
long as the number of member-states was low and the number of issues the EEC-
level dealt with, was not too high. Inherent in the European integration concept is 
the idea of an ‘ever closer union’. So, from the beginning it was apparent that this 
method could not last forever. Old habits, however, hardly die. There are many 
path-dependencies involved. 
The fear to politicize is also seen in another characteristic of the Community method: an 
unidentified finality. There is no agreement on the end-goal of the European 
integration process apart from general terminology such as ‘ever closer union’ in 
the preamble of the EEC Treaty, the preservation of peace, protection of human 
rights and creation of strong economies. Former Prime minister Cameron of the 
UK, in his negotiations with the EU before the referendum on Brexit in 2016, 
tried unsuccessfully to water down the words ‘ever closer union’. Lack of 
agreement among the Member States on the end-goal does not mean that the 
European integration process is not a goal-oriented exercise. The EU as it has 
grown is in its legal characteristics first and for all ‘functional polity that is 
2 See for an example Dimitris Chryssochoou, Theorizing European Integration (Sage: 2001), chapter 
5 (‘Theorizing the European Consociation’) 
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organized around objectives’3. The European Court of Justice has used in its case 
law a systematic and teleological approach making arguments on the basis of the 
goals and the system of the Treaty or a specific legislative text in a directive. 
In 2004 I asked in another contribution the question whether unidentified finality could 
be considered as an essential element of a European Political Identity. At that time 
my answer was moderately positive in that more time was needed for the member-
states to decide on the finality of the EU4. Disagreement between the member-
states was still too strong. The negative result of the referenda on the 
constitutional treaty of the EU in 2004 in France and the Netherlands only 
strengthened resistance to far-fetched prospects about the future of the EU. The 
then Dutch government in a reaction on the negative outcome of the referendum 
even banned the European flag for a certain period. Pragmatic and practical steps 
are needed, not prospects. 
We need to know, however, what the EU is about. In order to come to the beginning of 
an answer to this difficult question and, at the same time, to show the demise of 
the Community method I will use the following structure and method. In three 
main chapters I will pay attention to the early years of the EEC, the dominance of 
the neo-liberal model in the 1980s until the financial crisis of 2008, and, finally the 
options used in theory and practice to re-lance the European project. The titles of 
the respective chapters are related to the terms embedded, dis-embedded and re-
embedded liberalism, taken from both Polyani John Ruggie. The method is will use 
is to assess the influence of the general context in the years 1958-1985, 1985-2008 
and 2008+ corresponding to the three tiered structure of this contribution. With 
general context I mean the general political conditions, e.g. periods of tension in 
during the Cold War, the ascent of neo-liberalism and the end of the Cold War, 
and the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008. 
3. The Treaty of Rome (1958) and its premises in an area of embedded 
liberalism
The conclusion of the Treaty of the EEC in Rome ended a period of deadlock in the 
European cooperation process, that started in 1954 when the French Parliament 
refused to discuss the plans for a European Defense Union and a Political Union. 
This refusal had more to do with resistance against cooperation with West-
Germany, but the death of Stalin in 1953 ended one of the most serious stages of 
the Cold War. The focus of the European cooperation project was now to be laid 
on the economy. Sensitive areas of ‘high politics’ related to sovereignty, such as 
defense and foreign policy, were taboo for the next thirty years. The core of the 
project became a ‘common market’, a ‘common commercial policy’ and a 
3 François-Xavier Millet, “The Respect for National Constitutional Identity”, in The Question of 
Competence in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 258.
4 Herman Voogsgeerd, “Unidentified Finality as an essential element of European Political 
Identity”, Siegener Periodicum zur Internationalen Empirischen Literaturwissenschaften (2002), 313.
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‘competition authority’ at the European level. I agree with Walters and Haahr, who 
put the common market as a component of what John Ruggie at the global level 
called ‘embedded liberalism’5. At world-wide level this meant a combination of 
‘moderate’ free trade within frameworks such as the GATT with the ability of 
nation states to manage their welfare states through safeguard procedures. At the 
EEC level a comparable combination existed during this period: there is a right to 
free movement in the common market, but there is a ‘largely positive view of the 
nation state’ in social welfare related topics6. This was definitely so during the so-
called transitory stage that ended the 31st of December 1969. Member-states had 
certain safeguarding powers, e.g. in case a sudden surge in the import of certain 
products from another member-state (Italy) would cause problems in the domestic 
market of the importing member-state (France), the European Commission could 
allow restrictions to that trade7. The member-states still had discretionary powers 
to limit free movement. The free movements of the common market served an 
end, but were not an end in itself, but only ‘a tool’ to pool energies of member-
states and to realize peace, stability, economic development and a rising standard 
of living8. 
Hans-Peter Ipsens’ work related to so-called ‘special purpose associations’ 
(Zweckverbände) of functional integration has been very influential in the earlier 
years of the EEC. Functional integration was the key to success and technocratic 
solutions for the common good were to be preferred instead of politics and 
emotions. Special purpose associations were definitely no ‘emotional associations’. 
Special purpose association were also no general purpose associations, only states 
were to be qualified as general purpose associations. The EEC could therefore not 
become a general purpose association. It was important to downplay the finality of 
the integration process: ‘ever closer union’ in the preamble of the EEC Treaty was 
sufficiently vague to serve this purpose. The nature of the European integration 
process had to remain open in character, at least as long as the member-states as 
Masters of the Treaties (Herren der Verträge) did not agree on the future of the 
integration process. Ipsen seemed to be content with the term ‘Community’ 
chosen for the EEC. The European project needed a term, that was not occupied 
by other entities such as (con)federation or union9. Examples of ‘special purpose 
associations’ were to be found in the economic realm, e.g. a customs union, the 
four economic freedoms, non-discrimination on the basis of nationality, but Ipsen 
did not exclude topics outside this area, e.g. cooperation on foreign policy. The 
term special purpose association is therefore extremely broad in scope and is not 
5 William Walters and Jens Henrik Haahr, “The Common Market”, Governing Europe. Discourse, 
Governmentality and European Integration (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 58.
6 William Walters and Jens Henrik Haahr, ibidem, 44.
7 Italian refrigerators case, Case 13/63 Italy versus Commission. [1963] ECR, 351.
8 William Walters and Jens Henrik Haahr, ibidem, 44.
9 Hans-Peter Ipsen, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht in Einzelstudien (1984), 80-92.
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limited to functional areas, e.g. agriculture, transport or specific sectors of the 
economy. The term is also flexible as Ipsen did not oppose to occasional cases of 
desintegration10.
Although the concept is powerful in its potential to clarify the earlier years of the EEC 
and the first successful steps towards economic integration in Europe, I agree with 
the complaint heard from Giandomenico Majone from the title of his book 
Integration by Stealth11. Over the years and after many Court cases from the 
European Court of Justice in Luxembourg, integration in the economic sphere 
(and therefore also political because the two are difficult to separate) was pushed 
to a level not known to the original authors of the Treaty. This proofs the success 
of the concept. But in fact, the common market was in the words of Sauter and 
Schepel ‘imposed on the member-states’ by the European Court of Justice12. 
Especially after the transitory stage in 1970 the common market freedoms were 
interpreted more and more extensively by the ECJ. This happened at first for the 
important free movement of goods with important Court cases in Dassonville and 
Cassis de Dijon13. Not much later case law concerning free movement of persons 
followed. The free movement of services and capital were essentially dealt with in 
the following period of ‘dis-embedded liberalism’. 
4. The Single European Act (1985) and the ascent of neo-liberalism and dis-
embedded liberalism
The mid 1980s became a real watershed in the history of the European integration 
project. Apart from the beginning years and the active EEC Commission under 
president Walter Hallstein that lasted until the empty chair crisis in 1963, the 
period between 1985 and 1992 also may be qualified as a very successful period of 
European integration, this time under European Commission president Jacques 
Delors. The context during these years changed dramatically. The rise of supply-
side economics, combined with pleas for deregulation and privatization, influenced 
the dominant discourse in the EEC. The famous Lord Cockfield report on the 
costs of non-Europe laid the groundwork for the realization of the ‘internal 
market’, an area without internal borders (article 14, paragraph 2 EC, now article 
26, paragraph 2 TFEU)14. This discursive change from common to internal market 
is not without impact. In the period before 1985 the role of governments was seen 
as essential, after 1958 this changed. Walters and Haahr see this development as 
“something of a reversal in the figures of the state and the market”15. The market is 
10 As quoted in Voogsgeerd.
11 Giandomenico Majone, Dilemmas of European Integration: The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of Integration 
by Stealth, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
12 Wolf Sauter and Harm Schepel, State and Market in European Union Law, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009).
13 Case 8/74, Dassonville [1974] ECR, 837 and case 120/78, Cassis de Dijon [1979] ECR 649.
14 Cockfield White Paper, 1985, Completing the Internal Market, Luxembourg, Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities.
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‘good’ and states have to interfere as little as possible. Giubonni is of the same 
opinion, when he talks about the reversal of the relationship between social policy 
and as he calls it ‘the law of economics’16. The premises on which the EEC Treaty 
of Rome rested changed. Asymmetries did arise between national democratic 
control and world-wide economic processes and also between social rights and 
economic market freedoms17.
New areas were tried in case law of the ECJ. Free movement of capital was completely 
liberalized with the Treaty of Maastricht (1992). Case law concerning this freedom 
has been quite radical in the sense that even minor dissuasive effects on capital 
moves would trigger this freedom. Government shareholding positions in 
companies, so-called ‘golden shares’ were deemed to be against freedom of capital. 
The Volkswagen-battle between Germany and the European Commission lasted 
several years. In 2007 the ECJ took the side of the Commission concerning the so-
called Volkswagen law, that protected certain (public) shareholders18. Free 
movement of services was radicalized as well. Now that an internal market in 
goods was almost completely realized, the service economy needed to be pushed. 
Posting of workers from other member-states within the freedom to provide 
services was put on the agenda of the European legislator after the case Rush 
Portuguesa19. Employers from member-state A, who performed a service in another 
member-state, were allowed to bring their own workers temporarily to the other 
member-state under the labour conditions of the home state. In an economically 
diverse EU with richer and poorer countries, especially after the accession of eight 
Central and Eastern European countries to the EU, this had large consequences. 
This development lead to the posting of workers directive 96/71/EC, which 
allowed the host member-state to impose at least the national minimum wage on 
these workers, but for many richer member-states this was not enough. On top of 
this, many self-employed from poorer countries profited from the freedom of 
establishment and they competed on price with their colleagues from richer 
European countries. Economic freedoms seemed to be given priority to social 
protection, as the famous cases of Viking and Laval from the end of 2007 showed20
. Collective actions by trade unions were tested against the freedom of 
establishment in Viking and against the freedom to provide services in Laval. The 
important link in embedded-liberalism between free trade externally and welfare 
15 William Walters and Jens Henrik Haahr, “The Common Market”, Governing Europe. Discourse, 
Governmentality and European Integration (London, New York: Routledge, 2005), 44.
16 Stefano Giubboni, Social Rights and Market Freedom in the European Constitution (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 20.
17 See especially the strong arguments of Fritz Scharpf, Governing in Europe. Effective and 
Democratic?, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), chapter 2 ‘Negative and positive integration’. 
18 Case C-112/05, Commission versus Germany, 23 October 2007. See on this case the short 
contribution of Wolf-Georg Ringe, “The Volkswagen Case and the European Court of Justice”, 
Common Market Law Review, vol. 45, 2008. 
19 Case C-113/89, Rush Portuguesa [1990] ECR I-1417.
20 Case C-438/05, Viking [2007] ECR I-10779 and case C-341/05, Laval [2007] I-11767.
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state internally was finally broken. Many authors protested against these radical 
developments. Joerges and Rödl talk about an EU social deficit and argue that 
social policies should have been left to the member-states21. Holmes is of the 
opinion that one should re-examine “the balance between national regulatory 
sovereignty and the goal of trade liberalization”, now that market integration 
within the EU “begins to bite on more sensitive areas”22. The financial crisis that 
struck the U.S. and the Western world in 2008 also had large consequences, 
although these consequences came in the open much later. In 2011 Crouch still 
asked the question why neo-liberalism did not die after these vehement crises23. 
Only in 2016 with the UK referendum on a Brexit and the election of president 
Trump in the U.S. did it become clear that the crisis in neoliberalism could have 
large consequences. 
5. The Treaty of Lisbon (2009) and after. Re-embedding liberalism? 
Negotiations on the new Lisbon Treaty more or less coincided with the financial and 
economic crisis that struck Western countries in 2008, but that crisis did not have 
any immediate impact on the text of the new Treaty. The question has been raised 
whether ‘Lisbon’ led to major changes in the legal order of the EU24. Millet 
answers the question in the negative as path-dependency is more important than 
newer developments. Moreover, the Court of Justice, after Lisbon called CJEU 
instead of ECJ, does not have incentives to change its case law under the new 
Treaty25. Less drastic changes did nonetheless happen at the level of the new Treaty 
text with consequences of the case law of the CJEU. Article 4, paragraph 2 of the 
TEU is of interest here. In this provision the national constitutional identity of the 
Member states is, from now on, explicitly protected. This identity consists of in the 
words of the provision: “their essential State functions, including ensuring the 
territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding 
national security”. This provision has to be operationalized by the CJEU and 
balanced against the interests of the internal market and the standards of article 2 
TEU in which the foundational values of the Union are mentioned: “respect for 
human rights, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, including the rights of 
persons belonging to minorities”. 
21 See especially Christian Joerges and Florian Rödl, “Informal Politics, Formalised Law and the 
‘Social Deficit’ of European integration: Reflections after the Judgements of the ECJ in Viking and 
Laval”, European Law Journal. 2009, 15:1, 1-19.
22 Peter Holmes, “Trade and ‘domestic’ policies: the European mix”, Journal of European Public 
Policies, 13: 6 (2006), 816.
23 Colin Crouch, The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism, (Polity press, 2011).
24 See the volume edited by Loïc Azoulai, The Question of Competence in the European Union, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014).
25 François-Xavier Millet, “The Respect for National Constitutional Identity”, p. 258 in the 
volume mentioned in the preceding reference.
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This new focus on the constitutional identity of the member-states is one example of re-
embedding liberalism. In the earlier stage of dis-embedded liberalism the scope of 
the four economic freedoms of the internal market was widened as much as 
possible. The internal market should become as close to a domestic market as 
possible. But in this third stage important interests of the member-states were to 
be better protected than before. The German Constitutional Court in its Lisbon 
Decision emphasized this element of constitutional identity. As in its earlier Solange 
decisions and the Maastricht Decision the Constitutional Court reiterated that the 
EU, as a Staatenbund, a confederation, is bound to respect fundamental human 
rights (Solange), the principle of democracy (Maastricht Decision) and now the 
constitutional identity of the member-states. That this last topic is taken seriously 
by the CJEU as well became clear in the Omega, Sayn-Wittgenstein and Runevic-Vardyn 
cases26. The case Sayn-Wittgenstein is the most interesting of the three, as that case 
explicitly refers to the constitution of the Republic of Austria in which there is a 
provision, article xx, that bans the bearing of nobility titles. The CJEU accepted 
this ban and this implied that a female German-born self-employed selling 
perfumes etc. to clients in Austria was not allowed to call herself princess (Fürstin) 
of Sayn-Wittgenstein in her advertising. This, although there was a clear link with 
her activity as seller of perfume. Omega concerned the banning in Germany of laser 
games for children, accepted by the CJEU on public interest grounds. Runevic-
Vardyn dealt with spelling rules, that differed between Poland and Lithuania. Here 
the CJEU accepted the law of the land, member-states do not have to respect the 
spelling rules of another member-state27. The president of the CJEU, Lenaerts, in 
an academic contribution admitted that “where the core values of the Union are 
not in danger, the ECJ favours ‘value diversity’”28. This argument presupposes that 
in case of a conflict between the core values of the EU and the core values of a 
member-state the CJEU might choose for the first. But later Lenaerts admits that 
the CJEU will do its best to take both EU and national interest into account. It will 
try to accommodate both levels29. An open conflict between the member-state and 
the EU level is not a good thing. This will have to be avoided. 
Respect for the constitutional identity of the member-states is one relatively small 
element of re-embedding the internal market. More difficult is to address the 
general consequence of decades of internal market case law: an increasing 
‘economization’. Many aspects are seen first and for all through an economic lens. 
26 Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen, [2004] ECR I-9609; case C-208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein, [2010] I-
3696 and case C-391/09 Runevic-Vardyn, [2011] ECR I-3787. 
27 Compare this case with the much older case Konstantinidis (C-168/91, ECR [1993], I-1191) in 
which Germany had to respect the Greek alphabet, in which the name was written differently than 
the German authorities did. For professional reasons related to the economic freedom of persons 
(workers) the ECJ supported the argument brought forward by Konstantinidis.
28 Koen Lenaerts, “The Court’s Outer and Inner Selves”, Judging Europe’s Judges. The Legitimacy of 
the Case Law of the European Court of Justice (Hart Publishing, 2015), 60. 
29 Koen Lenaerts, ibidem.
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Authors submit that the case law of the CJEU is characterized by ‘some degree of 
economic bias’30. The CJEU enables negative harmonization through the four 
economic freedoms of the Treaty in the absence of sufficient positive 
harmonization through EU legislation because of a lack of competence of the EU 
in a specific area or the lack of sufficient votes to legislate from the member-states. 
Economization and de-politicization are causes of unease among large parts of the 
population. William Davies, in a critical analysis of neoliberalism asks himself why 
economics should be “a better analytical basis for government than other political 
or scientific forms of authority”31. De-politicization and government by experts, 
useful in the beginning years of the EEC, have reached their limit. Moreover, 
primacy of economics and the increasing role of experts in Brussels and national 
capitals did have redistributive consequences32. The referendum for a Brexit can be 
qualified as a return for the primacy of politics by large parts of the population 
who felt forgotten by their own national government. Brexit itself can therefore be 
qualified as an example of re-embedding markets33. The EU has to react on this 
development and forget about the traditional Community method. Politics matters.
6. Plans for the immediate future of the EU
Making plans for the immediate future of the EU is difficult as ideas concerning the 
end-goal of the EU still diverge in 2017. As the French President Emmanuel 
Macron in his Sorbonne lecture of 26 September 2017 focused on the need to 
‘relaunch’ European integration, because of a lack of a long-term vision and 
suffering from the need for unanimous decisions, he perfectly addressed the 
tension between the two. A long-term vision is impossible as long as the member-
states disagree on this. The Dutch Prime Minister Rutte, for example, is only 
interested in practical and down-to-earth decisions and not at all in blueprints for 
an EU future34. How to solve this dilemma?
The European Commission White Paper on the future of Europe of March 2017 is the 
first main endeavor on the future for the EU 27 after Brexit that needs to be 
discussed here. Five scenarios are given in the White Paper. All five do not 
mention legal or institutional aspects because the Commission assumes that form 
will follow the function35. This assumption is acceptable as the scenarios are meant 
only to stimulate thinking. It is important, however not to limit oneself to the 
30 D. Leczykiewicz, “Conceptualising Conflict between the Economic and the Social in EU Law 
after Viking and Laval”, Viking, Laval and Beyond eds. M. Freedland and J. Prassl, (Hart Publishing, 
2014), 234.
31 William Davies, The Limits of Neoliberalism, (Sage, 2017), 10.
32 See the interesting analysis by David Kennedy, A World of Struggle. How Power, Law and Expertise 
Shape Global Political Economy, (Princeton, 2016).
33 See Jonathan Hopkin, “When Polanyi met Farage: Market fundamentalism, economic 
nationalism, and Britain’s exit from the European Union”, The British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations, 2017, 19 (3), 465-478.
34 Speech of Emmanuel Macron, Paris, Sorbonne, 26th of September 2017. 
35 European Commission, White Paper on the Future of Europe, 2017, p. 15.
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functionalist logic. Scenario 1 to 5 do not seem to fit in a continuum from less to 
more integration. The first scenario, ‘Carrying on’ implies almost no change to the 
actual stage of the EU and scenario 2 ‘nothing but the single market’ is a step 
backwards and at the same time not an improvement with respect to the issues 
mentioned before. Scenario 2 will automatically imply a larger say concerning the 
practicalities of the internal market for member-states and their national courts. 
The scenario even specifically mentions border controls at the internal borders of 
the EU, and steps backwards concerning free movement of workers and services36. 
Scenario 3, ‘those who want to do more’ is a continuation of an already existing 
possibility of enhanced cooperation. In article 20 TEU a general provision deals 
with the possibility of enhanced cooperation by a smaller number of member-
states, but this is limited to the non-exclusive competences of the EU. Specific 
provisions on special cooperation exist for example in the areas of Common 
Foreign and Defense cooperation (article 42, paragraph 6 and article 46 TEU) and 
mutual recognition of judicial decisions in the area of criminal law (article 82, 
paragraph 3 TFEU), Scenario 4, ‘doing less more efficiently’ focuses on 
implementation and enforcement issues. A more efficient EU is welcomed, but in 
return topics have to be given back to the level of the member-states. Specifically 
mentioned policy areas to return to the member-states are parts of employment 
policy not directly related to the internal market, public health and regional 
development. On the other hand a European Border and Coast Guard takes over 
control of the external border of the EU. The idea of a deal in giving some powers 
back to the member-states and enforce other powers more effectively and 
efficiently at EU level is an attractive one. It will solve part of the problems 
mentioned before concerning the dominance of neoliberalism. The fifth scenario, 
‘doing much more together’ does not seem realistic at this moment in time. 
Scenario 3 has already been criticized by some Central and Eastern European 
countries and now also by President of the European Council, Donald Tusk. He 
seems to have taken a position in the middle, no far-sights, only practical deals in a 
limited number of issues such as defense, trade deals with third countries, 
combatting cyber-crime, solidarity in climate and energy issues, a new social 
dimension in the EU, fiscal justice, control of immigration and digital revolution. 
This looks very much like the first scenario. 
The White Paper and the plans of President Tusk both do not refer to institutional and 
legal issues. Nevertheless, it will be inevitable to deal with these issues in the near 
future as well. In order to end with the obsolete Community method and to try 
new roads the relationship between the EU and its member-states will have to be 
addressed. What is the role nowadays of the Masters of the Treaties (Herren der 
Verträge) after more than sixty years of European law? Some authors assume that 
the nation state is the main problem in the EU37. They are the cause of the 
36 European Commission, Ibidem, p. 18.
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malfunctioning of the EU at this moment. Others assume that the EU should stop 
weakening the nation state. This view is now adhered to by nobody less than 
former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. In my view this is only possible by naming 
the EU what it actually is, not an ordinary international organization but a 
confederation, a Staatenbund. To a certain extent the member-states need to be 
protected and they need to be able to take measures in extraordinary situations. 
But the confederation has to be capable of taking decisions. If member-states only 
disagree, there is no strong future for the EU. Some decision-making mechanisms 
need therefore to be in place in the confederation. 
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